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TIME FOR THE COURT TO BECOME 
“INTIMATE” WITH SURVEILLANCE 
TECHNOLOGY 
Abstract: The Fourth Amendment protects people’s reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy when there is an actual, subjective expectation of privacy 
and when society recognizes that expectation as reasonable. Therefore, 
Fourth Amendment protections should evolve over time according to so-
ciety’s beliefs about which areas of an individual’s life should be pro-
tected. Law enforcement has seized on the rapid growth in technology 
over the past two decades to expand its surveillance capabilities. Fourth 
Amendment protections, however, have not kept pace with technology. 
Consequently, federal courts have used outdated precedent that ad-
dresses archaic forms of surveillance technology when analyzing the con-
stitutionality of law enforcement’s use of significantly more sophisticated 
surveillance technology. Some states have expressed dissatisfaction with 
this outdated precedent and have relied on their own state constitutions 
to provide citizens with increased protection. Acknowledging a change in 
what society recognizes as a reasonable expectation of privacy, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, in United States v. Maynard, ruled 
that prolonged use of Global Positioning System (GPS) surveillance 
technology deserves Fourth Amendment protections because GPS creates 
an “intimate picture.” The D.C. Circuit’s “intimate picture” test ought to 
be used by other courts to appropriately protect individuals from ever-
changing forms of surveillance technology. 
Introduction 
 The growth of technology has surged in recent years.1 As a result, 
technology has become integrated into our everyday lives and has 
made us more willing to provide strangers with private information in 
exchange for their promise to make our interactions “broader, more 
intimate, more efficient, and more productive.”2 Nevertheless, there is 
                                                                                                                      
 
1 Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment to Twen-
ty-First Century Technologies, 53 Hastings L.J. 1303, 1306 (2002). 
2 In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-
Site Info. (Cell-Site Info.), 736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 595–96 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). Although Judge 
James Orenstein, a federal magistrate judge, denied the government’s application for ac-
cess to cell-site data, U.S. District Court Judge Roslynn Mauskopf reversed the decision on 
November 29, 2010. In re Application of the U.S. For an Order Authorizing the Release of 
Historical Cell-Site Info., No. 10-MC-0897, 2010 WL 5437209, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 
1909 
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a downside to this increased interconnectedness.3 The incorporation of 
technology into our lives comes with a price.4 The same technology 
that connects us to those around us allows the government to piggy-
back on to these connections without any additional action on our 
part.5 The government’s ability to more easily peer into our lives, how-
ever, is subject to protections provided by the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.6 
                                                                                                                     
 The Fourth Amendment honors “every man’s liberty and pri-
vacy . . . .”7 It provides each individual with the right to be “secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches 
and seizures.”8 At its core, the Fourth Amendment protects people from 
unreasonable government intrusion.9 Although what constitutes a 
“search” and a “seizure” has been the subject of much jurisprudential 
debate, courts have agreed that searches or seizures conducted without 
warrants are unreasonable.10 A warrant may only be issued by an impar-
tial judicial officer that stands between the citizen and the police upon 
an unquestionable showing of probable cause.11 Through these barri-
 
2010). While an opinion from Judge Mauskopf is still forthcoming, Judge Orenstein de-
nied another government application for cell-site data on December 23, 2010, arguing that 
Judge Mauskopf’s decision is not controlling authority. Id. at *1, *4. In denying the gov-
ernment’s request for 113 days of historical cell-site data, Judge Orenstein relied on his 
rationale in Cell-Site Info. and recent developments in the case law. Id. at *1–4. This Note 
relies on Cell-Site Info. for its language and arguments, not for its authority. Cell-Site Info, 736 
F. Supp. 2d 578. 
3 James Tomkovicz, Technology and the Threshold of the Fourth Amendment: A Tale of Two 
Futures, 72 Miss. L.J. 317, 318–20 (2002) (describing the enhancement of human capabili-
ties afforded by technological innovations as a “sword with two very sharp edges,” where 
one edge can preserve national security, while the other endangers its fundamental exis-
tence); see United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub 
nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011). The Court is scheduled to hear oral 
arguments in Jones on November 7, 2011. Supreme Court of the United States October 
2011–For the Session Beginning October 31, 2011 (Aug. 8, 2011), http://www.supreme 
court.gov/oral_arguments/argument_calendars/MonthlyArgumentCalNov2011.pdf. The 
Court is expected to rule on whether prolonged use of GPS surveillance without a warrant 
offends Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. Jones, 
131 S. Ct. 3064 (granting U.S. petition on June 27, 2011). 
4 Tomkovicz, supra note 3, at 320; see Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562; Cell-Site Info., 736 F. 
Supp. 2d at 590. 
5 See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 565; Cell-Site Info., 736 F. Supp. 2d at 590. 
6 See U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
7 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 756 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see U.S. 
Const. amend. IV. 
8 U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
9 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001); see U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
10 Renée M. Hutchins, Tied up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 55 
UCLA L. Rev. 409, 421 (2007); see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
11 Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. 
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ers, the Constitution fortifies the right to privacy and ensures the protec-
tion of the citizenry from government intrusion.12 
                                                                                                                     
 The government’s warrantless use of surveillance technology has 
challenged Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.13 Original, crude sur-
veillance technology was limited in its usefulness.14 Such early forms of 
surveillance were not particularly accurate, required law enforcement 
to remain in close contact with the suspect, and had no way of auto-
matically storing collected information.15 Over time, however, surveil-
lance technology has advanced to a point such that earlier forms are 
almost unrecognizable.16 Current surveillance technology allows law 
enforcement to monitor an individual’s movements both in a car and 
on foot, unbeknownst to the individual being monitored.17 For exam-
ple, the Global Positioning System (GPS) allows law enforcement to 
track a vehicle’s movements through a computer, unhindered by the 
physical limitations of police-conducted visual surveillance.18 In addi-
tion, cell-site data, a signal that every cell phone emits, has expanded 
surveillance outside the vehicle and provides law enforcement with ac-
curate information about an individual’s whereabouts.19 
 These advancements in surveillance technology have far outpaced 
the evolution of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.20 Many scholars 
have argued that the current state of Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence lacks a genuine understanding of privacy given the realities of 
modern technology.21 These scholars argue that because there has 
been widespread development in forms of technology that are capable 
of impinging on a person’s privacy, courts must interpret the Fourth 
 
12 See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Tomkovicz, supra note 3, at 325. 
13 Simmons, supra note 1, at 1322; see United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282–84 
(1983); Maynard, 615 F.3d at 557–58. 
14 See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278 (involving a beeper placed in a vehicle that emitted a sig-
nal that could be picked up by police when they were close enough to receive it). 
15 See id. 
16 See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 565 (involving the monitoring of vehicular movement twen-
ty-four hours a day); Cell-Site Info., 736 F. Supp. 2d at 578–79 (involving the monitoring of 
an individual’s movements through their cell phone). 
17 See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 565; Cell-Site Info., 736 F. Supp. 2d at 578–79. 
18 GPS Devices Do the Work of Law Enforcement Agents, NPR.org (Oct. 27, 2010), http:// 
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130851849. 
19 Patrick T. Chamberlain, Note, Court Ordered Disclosure of Historical Cell Site Location In-
formation: The Argument for a Probable Cause Standard, 66 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1745, 1747 
(2009); Kevin McLaughlin, The Fourth Amendment and Cell Phone Location Tracking: Where Are 
We?, 29 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 421, 422 (2007). 
20 See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558; Cell-Site Info., 736 F. Supp. 2d at 582. 
21 Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 1511, 1512 (2010). 
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Amendment broadly to adequately protect individual liberty.22 This 
Note proposes a means by which courts might do so.23 It argues that 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, in the 2010 case of 
United States v. Maynard, developed an analysis that should be applied to 
modern forms of surveillance technology.24 This “intimate picture” 
analysis balances the inherently competing goals of effectively fighting 
crime and upholding individual rights and freedom.25 
                                                                                                                     
 Part I of this Note introduces the development of the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and explores the in-
fluence that technology has had on Fourth Amendment protections.26 
Part II addresses the technology behind GPS and examines how it is 
used by law enforcement to aid in surveillance.27 It then discusses how 
courts have addressed the issue of whether GPS surveillance constitutes 
a search under the Fourth Amendment.28 Part III introduces cell-site 
technology to illustrate the effects that the D.C. Circuit Court’s ruling 
in Maynard had on the constitutionality of surveillance technology.29 
Part IV argues that current Supreme Court precedent regarding tech-
nological surveillance and one’s reasonable expectation of privacy does 
not reflect current societal norms and does not provide sufficient 
Fourth Amendment protections.30 It then demonstrates why Maynard’s 
“intimate picture” approach is a proper way to address prolonged sur-
veillance technology and should be adopted by the courts.31 
I. Fourth Amendment Protections 
 The Supreme Court’s interpretation of a Fourth Amendment 
“search” has changed over time in an effort to evolve with society’s 
changing notions of what constitutes a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.32 Section A addresses the Supreme Court’s expansion of Fourth 
 
22 Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the 
Case for Caution, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 801, 804 (2004) (referring to this majority approach as 
“the popular view of the Fourth Amendment and new technologies”). 
23 See infra notes 298–327 and accompanying text. 
24 See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563; In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Da-
ta (Cell Site Data), 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 840 (S.D. Tex. 2010); Cell-Site Info., 736 F. Supp. 2d 
at 584. 
25 See Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 840; Cell-Site Info., 736 F. Supp. 2d at 584. 
26 See infra notes 32–86 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 87–107 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 108–191 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 192–224 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 225–278 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra notes 279–327 and accompanying text. 
32 See Hutchins, supra note 10, at 427. 
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Amendment protection, from protecting only against trespass to pro-
tecting one’s reasonable expectation of privacy.33 Section B then dis-
cusses how the Supreme Court has incorporated technology into its 
Fourth Amendment precedent.34 
A. Shift Away from Common-Law Trespass 
 Prior to 1967, the Supreme Court defined a “search” as a physical 
invasion by the government.35 A physical invasion only occurred when 
law enforcement officials physically trespassed on a person’s property.36 
In 1967, however, the Supreme Court in Katz v. United States broadened 
the definition of a “search.”37 In Katz, the Court rejected the “trespass 
doctrine” and declared that the Fourth Amendment protects people, 
not places.38 Expanding on this new idea, the Court explained that 
Fourth Amendment protections extend to those areas that a person 
seeks to preserve as private, but do not reach those areas that a person 
knowingly exposes to the public.39 
 In Katz, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents attached an 
electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the public 
telephone booth that petitioner used to make illegal gambling wa-
gers.40 The Court concluded that, despite entering a phone booth that 
was partly constructed of glass, the petitioner intended to exclude oth-
ers from listening in on his conversation.41 This intent to exclude made 
the government’s surveillance a search.42 Thus, even though there was 
no physical trespass by the government on the phone booth, the gov-
ernment’s actions violated the petitioner’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy.43 
                                                                                                                      
33 See infra notes 35–51 and accompanying text. 
34 See infra notes 52–86 and accompanying text. 
35 Hutchins, supra note 10, at 423; see Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
36 April A. Otterberg, Note, GPS Tracking Technology: The Case for Revisiting Knotts and 
Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. 
Rev. 661, 672 (2005). 
37 Simmons, supra note 1, at 1303; see Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
38 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351, 353. 
39 Id. at 351–52. 
40 Id. at 348. 
41 Id. at 352. 
42 See id. 
43 See id. at 353. 
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 Justice John Marshall Harlan II, in his concurring opinion, deline-
ated a two-part test to clarify the Court’s ruling that the Fourth 
Amendment protects one’s reasonable expectation of privacy.44 First, 
to obtain Fourth Amendment protections, a person must have exhibited 
an actual, subjective expectation of privacy.45 Second, that expectation 
must be one that society is prepared to recognize as “reasonable.”46 This 
test was intended to allow the Fourth Amendment to address changes in 
technology.47 By expanding the Fourth Amendment’s reach beyond 
physical trespass and focusing it instead on protecting individual privacy, 
the Katz test broadened the scope of Fourth Amendment protections.48 
The Court acknowledged that what a person seeks to preserve as pri-
vate, even in an area that is publically accessible, may still be constitu-
tionally protected.49 By focusing on a “legitimate expectation of privacy,” 
the test concerns itself with the type of information that can be acquired 
as a result of a search and disregards law enforcement’s methods in 
conducting the surveillance.50 Courts have subsequently adopted this 
test when conducting Fourth Amendment analyses to determine wheth-
er a particular intrusion by the government constitutes a search.51 
B. The Fourth Amendment’s Adoption of Technology 
 Advances in surveillance technology have increased police effi-
ciency, enabling law enforcement to expend fewer resources while con-
ducting surveillance at a level that would be otherwise unattainable 
given the limitations of human sensory faculties.52 As technology has 
advanced and provided law enforcement with extra-human capabilities, 
courts have struggled to ensure that the Fourth Amendment continues 
to protect against unreasonable searches and seizures.53 
                                                                                                                      
44 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
45 Id. Demonstrating a subjective expectation of privacy requires the exhibition of in-
tention to keep objects, activities, or statements to oneself. Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Simmons, supra note 1, at 1304; Solove, supra note 21, at 1519. 
48 Hutchins, supra note 10, at 427; see Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
49 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351–52; Hutchins, supra note 10, at 453. 
50 Simmons, supra note 1, at 1305–06. 
51 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 280–81; Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563. 
52 See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282. 
53 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33–34; Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558; Christopher Slobogin, Techno-
logically-Assisted Physical Surveillance: The American Bar Association’s Tentative Draft Standards, 
10 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 383, 386 (1997). 
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1. Knotts: A Standard for Archaic Technology 
 In 1983, the Supreme Court, in Knotts, held that monitoring the 
movements of a vehicle by using a beeper acting as a tracking device did 
not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.54 In Knotts, po-
lice planted a battery-operated beeper containing a radio transmitter in 
the trunk of the defendant’s vehicle.55 The beeper emitted a signal from 
the trunk.56 The officers were able to monitor the beeper through a re-
ceiver that could pick up the signal when within physical range of the 
vehicle.57 This tracking helped law enforcement agents maintain inter-
mittent visual surveillance of the respondent’s vehicle.58 The beeper 
ultimately enabled the officers to track the vehicle to the respondent’s 
lake cabin, at which point they secured a search warrant for the cabin.59 
 In concluding that the use of the beeper did not constitute a 
search, the Court applied the two-part Katz test to analyze the govern-
ment’s conduct.60 The Court analogized the government surveillance 
through use of the beeper to police following an automobile on public 
streets.61 Because the respondent traveled on public streets, the Court 
reasoned, he voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look where 
he was traveling and what stops he was making.62 The Court concluded 
that there was no indication that the beeper was used in any way to re-
veal information that could not otherwise be viewed by the naked 
eye.63 Thus, the Court found that the use of the beeper to track the re-
spondent’s car did not invade any legitimate expectation of privacy.64 
The Court limited its holding, however, by acknowledging that if police 
should use technology to conduct “dragnet”-type law enforcement, dif-
ferent constitutional principles might apply.65 While the Court failed to 
                                                                                                                      
 
54 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285. 
55 Id. at 277. 
56 Id. at 278. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 278–79. 
60 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 280–81; see Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
61 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281. 
62 Id. at 281–82. 
63 Id. at 285. 
64 Id. 
65 See id. at 284. In response to the respondent’s argument that not requiring proper 
search warrants for use of this form of surveillance could lead to “twenty-four hour surveil-
lance of any citizen of this country . . . without judicial knowledge or supervision,” the 
Court reserved the issue of whether constant surveillance twenty-four hours a day, seven 
days a week would constitute a search because those facts were not presented. See id. at 
283–84. Instead, the Court acknowledged that if or when law enforcement uses technology 
1916 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:1909 
expound much further on those different constitutional principles, the 
Court did acknowledge that, depending on the volume and detail of 
information revealed by sense-enhancing surveillance, additional con-
stitutional protections may be required.66 
 The Court in Knotts centered its reasoning on the fact that the 
beeper merely enhanced the police’s natural-born sensory capabili-
ties.67 Since unaided visual tracking of the respondent’s vehicle would 
not have constituted a search, then, by merely augmenting their sense 
of sight through the use of technology, the police did not perform a 
search under the Fourth Amendment.68 Scholars, however, have found 
this rationale problematic because, in reality, the beeper did not merely 
enhance law enforcement’s visual capacity, but replaced it.69 It allowed 
the police to follow the respondent’s movements remotely, which they 
otherwise would have been physically unable to do.70 Notwithstanding 
scholarly criticism, the same line of reasoning that the Court used in 
Knotts has been subsequently used by courts when analyzing far more 
advanced forms of surveillance technology.71 
2. Preventing Technology from Eroding Privacy 
 The Supreme Court has recognized the power of technology to 
shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy under the Fourth Amend-
ment.72 In areas where surveillance technology allows for extra-sensory 
perception by law enforcement—which, at its core, exceeds human ca-
pability—the Court has determined that the use of such technology is a 
search.73 
 For example, in 2001, in Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme Court 
held that the use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at a private home 
to detect the amount of heat emitted was an unlawful search and thus 
                                                                                                                      
that is capable of conducting surveillance twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, a 
constitutional analysis would be appropriate. See id. 
66 Hutchins, supra note 10, at 440; see Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284. 
67 See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282. 
68 See id.; Hutchins supra note 10, at 435–36. 
69 Slobogin, supra note 53, at 400; see Tomkovicz, supra note 3, at 365. 
70 Slobogin, supra note 53, at 400. 
71 See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285; United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th 
Cir. 2010); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007). 
72 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33–34; Hutchins, supra note 10, at 436; Otterberg, supra note 
36, at 691. 
73 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40; Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1985) 
(finding that flying over a chemical manufacturing facility merely enhanced human capa-
bility and thus was not a search); Maynard, 615 F.3d at 565. 
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violated the Fourth Amendment.74 The petitioner in Kyllo was sus-
pected of growing marijuana in his home with the aid of high-intensity 
lamps.75 An agent for the U.S. Department of the Interior used a ther-
mal imaging device aimed at the exterior of the petitioner’s home.76 
The thermal imager detected infrared radiation—which is not visible to 
the naked eye—and displayed images based on each object’s relative 
warmth.77 With the thermal images, the police could identify the high 
intensity lamps under which the marijuana grew.78 
 The majority recognized that the rule they adopted in Kyllo must 
deal directly with the use of technology and must take into account 
more sophisticated forms of technology than the thermal imaging 
technology present in the particular case.79 The Court focused its analy-
sis on the fact that the technology allowed authorities to gain informa-
tion about the inside of a home that could not otherwise have been 
obtained through more traditional and less invasive forms of surveil-
lance.80 Because thermal imaging was extra-sensory, the Court con-
cluded that its use to reveal details pertaining to the interior of the 
home was a search.81 
 The dissenting justices argued that the same information regard-
ing the heat levels of the interior of the home could have been ob-
tained by any member of the public who might notice that one part of 
the house was warmer than another.82 For example, any observer 
would notice if “rainwater evaporates or snow melts at different rates 
across its surfaces.”83 In addition, heat waves enter the public domain if 
and when they leave a building, so a subjective expectation that they 
would remain private is not “one that society is prepared to recognize 
as reasonable.”84 The majority, however, dismissed these arguments, 
refusing to accept such a “mechanical interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment . . . .”85 Thus, while the dissent opted for a more formalis-
tic approach to Fourth Amendment protections, Kyllo shows the 
                                                                                                                      
74 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40. 
75 Id. at 29. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 29–30. 
78 Id. at 30. 
79 Id. at 36. 
80 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. 
81 Id. at 40. 
82 Id. at 43 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 43–44 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
85 See id. at 35 (majority opinion). 
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Court’s reluctance to apply a bright-line test to surveillance technol-
ogy.86 
II. Global Positioning System 
 Law enforcement’s use of GPS technology has challenged courts’ 
ability to use existing precedent to effectively protect individual liber-
ties.87 Section A presents the science behind GPS technology and in-
troduces how law enforcement has used GPS technology to conduct 
surveillance.88 Section B examines how federal courts have analyzed 
the constitutionality of warrantless GPS tracking by drawing parallels 
between older forms of technology for which the Supreme Court has 
established precedent.89 Section C addresses how state courts, employ-
ing “new federalism,” have conducted their own constitutional analyses 
over the use of GPS technology.90 Finally, Section D examines the D.C. 
Circuit’s reliance on the “intimate picture” doctrine in the 2010 case of 
United States v. Maynard to hold that prolonged use of GPS surveillance 
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.91 
A. GPS and Its Application for Law Enforcement 
 GPS is a space-based global navigation system that reveals informa-
tion about the location, speed, and direction of a subject.92 Originally 
developed by the U.S. Department of Defense in the 1970’s for use in 
warfare, GPS technology has taken on several civilian applications since 
its inception.93 GPS satellites—there are currently over thirty—circle 
the Earth and broadcast a transmission which is picked up by a receiver 
on Earth.94 Part of the transmission is the satellites’ almanac data, 
which tells GPS receivers the locations of all GPS satellites at any given 
time.95 A GPS receiver obtains information from at least four satellites 
                                                                                                                      
86 See Hutchins, supra note 10, at 437; Otterberg, supra note 36, at 693; Simmons, supra 
note 1, at 1321. 
87 See Hutchins, supra note 10, at 444. 
88 See infra notes 92–107 and accompanying text. 
89 See infra notes 108–122 and accompanying text. 
90 See infra notes 123–156 and accompanying text. 
91 See infra notes 157–191 and accompanying text. 
92 Ron White & Tim Downs, How Global Positioning Systems Work, pcmag.com ( July 8, 
2008), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2316534,00.asp. 
93 Otterberg, supra note 36, at 666. 
94 Ken Kramer, Delta 4 Blast Off with Advanced New GPS Satellite Marks 50th Anniversary of 
Delta Program, SpaceRef (May 28, 2010), http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewnews.html? 
id=1397. 
95 White & Downs, supra note 92. 
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and uses this information to determine how far it is from each satellite 
and, thus, its own precise location on earth.96 
 Civilian access to GPS technology has improved over time.97 Be-
fore 2000, the government scrambled GPS signals to intentionally de-
grade GPS precision levels to hinder civilian GPS use.98 In 2000, the 
Clinton Administration made military level GPS technology available to 
the civilian public.99 Civilian use of GPS was further expanded in May 
2010 when the first of twelve GPS-IIF-1 satellites was placed into orbit, 
joining the thirty GPS satellites already in orbit.100 The GPS-IIF-1 im-
proves existing GPS capabilities; it includes a jam-resistant military sig-
nal and a new civil signal to enhance civilian capabilities, and it signifi-
cantly improves signal accuracy.101 Currently, some GPS receivers can 
pinpoint their location within meters or even centimeters.102 
                                                                                                                     
 Because of its accuracy and wide-scale availability, GPS has proven 
to be a more cost-effective and precise way for law enforcement to moni-
tor the movements of individuals than traditional forms of surveillance, 
which rely heavily on human capabilities.103 Police can simply place a 
small GPS device on an individual’s vehicle and continuously monitor 
the vehicle’s movement remotely from a computer, without losing sight 
of the individual.104 As a result, law enforcement officials have begun 
using GPS surveillance with increasing frequency.105 
 People convicted of crimes on the basis of evidence obtained 
through GPS surveillance have brought suits claiming that GPS moni-
toring without a warrant based on probable cause constitutes a search 
and thus violates the Fourth Amendment.106 Courts have divided into 
two camps on this issue.107 
 
 
96 Id. 
97 Otterberg, supra note 36, at 666. 
98 White & Downs, supra note 92. 
99 Statement on the Decision to Stop Degrading Global Positioning Systems Signals, 36 
Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 959 (May 1, 2000). 
100 John McHale, Boeing GPS IIF-1 Satellite Sends First Signals from Space, Military & Aero-
space Electronics (May 29, 2010), http://www.militaryaerospace.com/index/display/ 
articledisplay/3614463201/articles/military-aerospace-electronics/online-news-2/2010/5/ 
boeing-gps_iif-1_satellite.html. 
101 Id. 
102 How Does GPS Work?, GPSSystems ( Jan. 27, 2010, 7:36 PM), http://gpssystems.net/ 
how-does-gps-work/. 
103 Ben Hubbard, Police Turn to Secret Weapon: GPS Device, Wash. Post, Aug. 13, 2008, at 
A1. 
104 GPS Devices Do the Work of Law Enforcement Agents, supra note 18. 
105 Hubbard, supra note 103, at A1. 
106 See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub 
nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011); United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 
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B. GPS and Federal Courts 
 Three federal circuit courts of appeals have ruled that the use of 
GPS surveillance is not a search under the Fourth Amendment.108 In 
denying that the use of GPS tracking constitutes a search, these courts 
have relied on the reasoning in United States v. Knotts that nobody has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy when they knowingly expose them-
selves to the public by traveling on a public road.109 These courts have 
concluded that GPS surveillance, much like the beeper in Knotts, sub-
stitutes physically following a car on a public street because it captures 
qualitatively the same information.110 
 In 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United 
States v. Pineda-Moreno found that police did not unlawfully “search” the 
petitioner’s car by monitoring its location with the use of tracking de-
vices attached to the underside of the vehicle.111 Police, without a war-
rant, monitored the vehicle for four months by installing various types 
of mobile tracking devices that recorded and logged its movements.112 
Information from these mobile tracking devices led police to a sus-
pected marijuana grow site.113 The court concluded that Kyllo v. United 
States did not control because the information obtained through the 
tracking devices only substituted for information that agents could have 
otherwise obtained by following the car.114 Because the technology was 
                                                                                                                      
609 (8th Cir. 2010); United States. v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010); 
United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 995 (7th Cir. 2007). 
107 See infra notes 109–191 and accompanying text for a discussion of these two camps. 
108 See Marquez, 605 F.3d at 610 (finding that a person who travels on a public street has 
no reasonable expectation of privacy such that using a GPS to track the petitioner’s trips 
between Des Moines and Denver did not constitute a search); Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 
1215 (finding that a GPS tracking device placed on the underside of the petitioner’s vehi-
cle while it was parked in his driveway in order to monitor the vehicle’s movement was not 
a search); Garcia, 474 F.3d at 997 (finding that GPS tracking is merely a substitute for fol-
lowing a car and is thus not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); 
United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that the place-
ment of a GPS tracking device on the petitioner’s car while it was parked in his driveway 
was neither a search nor a seizure). 
109 See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983); Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 
1216; Garcia, 474 F.3d at 997. 
110 See Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216; Garcia, 474 F.3d at 997. 
111 Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1217. 
112 Id. at 1213. 
113 Id. at 1214. 
114 Id. at 1216; see Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 n.2 (2001). 
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similar to the beeper used in Knotts, the Ninth Circuit invoked Knotts 
and declined to pursue the issue further.115 
 Similarly, in United States v. Garcia, the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that GPS tracking was analogous technology to surveil-
lance cameras and satellite imaging.116 Because law enforcement’s use 
of surveillance cameras and satellite imaging does not constitute a 
search, neither does warrantless use of GPS to track individuals.117 In 
Garcia, police installed a GPS “memory tracking unit” under the rear 
bumper of the petitioner’s car.118 The information the police later re-
trieved from the GPS unit led them to evidence linking the petitioner 
to methamphetamine manufacturing.119 
 The Seventh Circuit did not find the police’s behavior inconsistent 
with the Fourth Amendment.120 The court ruled that the police had 
not seized the petitioner’s vehicle by attaching the GPS device because 
the device had no effect on the car’s appearance or functionality.121 
Additionally, like in Pineda-Moreno, the court in Garcia found that GPS 
surveillance acts as a substitute for visually following a car, and is thus 
not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.122 
C. State Courts and Warrantless GPS Surveillance 
 Although no federal court that had directly addressed the consti-
tutionality of GPS tracking prior to Maynard had found that such track-
ing constitutes a search, several states’ highest courts have found that 
GPS monitoring is a search requiring state constitutional protection.123 
                                                                                                                      
 
115 See Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216; Adam Koppel, Note, Warranting a Warrant: 
Fourth Amendment Concerns Raised by Law Enforcement’s Warrantless Use of GPS and Cellular 
Phone Tracking, 64 U. Miami L. Rev. 1061, 1079 (2010). 
116 Garcia, 474 F.3d at 997. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 995. 
119 Id. at 995–96. 
120 See id. at 997. 
121 See id. at 996. 
122 Garcia, 474 F.3d at 997–98. The court, however, indicated that new technologies al-
low for wholesale surveillance, and that one could imagine law enforcement instituting a 
program of mass surveillance that would be the equivalent of hiring ten million police 
officers to tail every vehicle on the nation’s roads. Id. at 998. If such a program of mass 
surveillance was instituted, then the time would be ripe to consider whether the Fourth 
Amendment should treat such surveillance as a search. Id. 
123 See Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356, 370 (Mass. 2009); People v. Weaver, 
909 N.E.2d 1195, 1203 (N.Y. 2009); State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 224 (Wash. 2003); see also 
United States v. Berry, 300 F. Supp. 2d 366, 368 (D. Md. 2004). The U.S. District Court for 
the District of Maryland, though declining to determine whether GPS requires a court 
order, indicated that the technology used in GPS surveillance is so much more intrusive 
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In doing so, these states have invoked the idea of “new federalism.”124 
This philosophy, which has developed in the last forty years, recognizes 
that the U.S. Constitution acts a floor, providing the minimum guaran-
tee of individual rights.125 In turn, states are free to independently de-
termine, according to their own state constitutions, the balance they 
strike between individual rights and the interests of state govern-
ment.126 Particularly in the area of criminal law, state courts have pro-
vided greater protections to individuals than their federal counter-
parts.127 In addition, “new federalism” can help clarify the Supreme 
Court’s understanding of the proper extent of protections afforded by 
the U.S. Constitution.128 It allows for debate and legal change in areas 
in which the Supreme Court has been unwilling to evolve.129 There-
fore, “new federalism” allows states to be progressive in developing le-
gal rules that reflect a rapidly changing society.130 
                                                                                                                     
 In 2003, the Washington Supreme Court, in State v. Jackson, was the 
first state court to address whether a warrant is required for police to 
use GPS tracking to monitor an individual’s vehicle.131 In Jackson, police 
obtained a warrant to attach a GPS tracking device to each of the de-
fendant’s two cars based on suspicion that he was involved in the disap-
pearance of his nine-year-old daughter.132 For several weeks, the police 
monitored Jackson’s vehicle, obtaining information about where he 
traveled and how long he spent at each location.133 Ultimately, the in-
formation the police received from the GPS tracking device led to the 
 
than the beeper used in Knotts that courts could find that its installation requires a court 
order. Id. 
124 See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State 
Constitutional Law, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1141, 1153 (1985); Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from 
All Fifty States: How to Apply the Fourth Amendment and Its State Analogs to Protect Third Party 
Information from Unreasonable Search, 55 Cath. U. L. Rev. 373, 393 (2006). This philosophy 
has also been referred to as “new judicial federalism.” See Jame N.G. Cauthen, Horizontal 
Federalism in the New Judicial Federalism: A Preliminary Look at Citations, 66 Alb. L. Rev. 783, 
785 (2003). 
125 Abrahamson, supra note 124, at 1153. 
126 Id. 
127 See Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Advances and Departures in the Criminal Law of the States: 
A Selective Critique, 69 Alb. L. Rev. 489, 491–92 (2006). 
128 See Robert K. Fitzpatrick, Note, Neither Icarus Nor Ostrich: State Constitutions as an In-
dependent Source of Individual Rights, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1833, 1855–56, 1872 (2004) (high-
lighting same-sex marriage as that which state courts have been more willing to accept 
than the Supreme Court). 
129 Id. at 1855–56. 
130 Id. at 1872. 
131 See 76 P.3d at 220. 
132 Id. at 220–21. 
133 See id. at 221. 
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discovery of Jackson’s daughter’s body and Jackson’s conviction for her 
murder.134 
 The Washington Supreme Court upheld a warrant requirement 
under the Washington State Constitution for the installation of a GPS 
device on an individual’s vehicle after the Washington Court of Appeals 
concluded that warrants authorizing GPS devices were unnecessary.135 
GPS devices, the Washington Supreme Court noted, do not just aug-
ment the officers’ senses used in traditional visual tracking, as would 
binoculars or flashlights, but instead act as a technological substitute for 
traditional visual tracking.136 The court was influenced by the fact that 
the GPS tracking at issue allowed for uninterrupted, twenty-four hour a 
day monitoring for two and a half weeks, a level of monitoring that an 
officer would otherwise not have been able to maintain through mere 
visual contact.137 Furthermore, the court noted that GPS monitoring is 
quite intrusive into an individual’s private affairs.138 Given that vehicular 
transportation is so frequent and that a person typically visits a variety of 
places, uninterrupted surveillance of travels paints a detailed picture of 
a person’s life.139 In focusing on the intrusiveness of the technology and 
the amount of information revealed, the Jackson court relied on the Su-
preme Court’s precedent from Katz v. United States.140 
 In 2009, the Court of Appeals of New York, the state’s highest 
court, addressed the constitutionality of warrantless GPS tracking in 
People v. Weaver and found that warrantless GPS tracking violated the 
                                                                                                                      
134 See id. 
135 Id. at 221, 224. The court noted that Article I, Section 7 of the Washington State 
Constitution, which governs searches and seizures, provides greater protection than the 
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 222; see U.S. Const. amend. IV; Wash. 
Const. art. I, § 7. 
136 Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223. 
137 Id.; Otterberg, supra note 36, at 681. 
138 Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223. 
139 Id. In illustrating the extent of personal information that GPS monitoring can re-
veal, the court provided, as an example, a detailed record of: 
[T]ravel to doctors’ offices, banks, gambling casinos, tanning salons, places of 
worship, political party meetings, bars, grocery stores, exercise gyms, places 
where children are dropped off for school, play, or day care, the upper scale 
restaurant and the fast food restaurant, the strip club, the opera, the baseball 
game, the “wrong” side of town, the family planning clinic, the labor rally. 
Id. 
140 Hutchins, supra note 10, at 448; see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) 
(Harlan, J., concurring) (extending constitutional protections to areas people seek to pre-
serve as private); Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223–24. 
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New York State Constitution.141 In Weaver, authorities used GPS to con-
tinuously monitor the location of the defendant’s van for sixty-five 
days.142 The location information of the van was remotely downloaded 
by investigators.143 The information obtained through GPS monitoring 
led to the defendant’s conviction on two burglary counts.144 
 The Court of Appeals of New York distinguished the GPS monitor-
ing technology in Weaver from the beeper in Knotts.145 It held that GPS is 
a “vastly different and exponentially more sophisticated and powerful 
technology” than the “very primitive tracking device” used in Knotts.146 
GPS tracking, the court concluded, provides a “new technological per-
ception” of the world where any object can be followed almost indefi-
nitely with its every move recorded.147 As in Jackson, the court in Weaver 
emphasized that GPS tracking over a lengthy period can create a de-
tailed profile of an individual’s life.148 The court invoked the reservation 
from Knotts regarding forms of technology that would allow for “twenty-
four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country” and indicated that, 
just twenty-six years after Knotts, the ability of government to conduct 
twenty-four hour “dragnet-type” surveillance had arrived.149 Since there 
is unsettled federal law on this issue, the court found that GPS surveil-
lance requires a warrant under the New York State Constitution.150 
 Although GPS technology has gained such popularity and taken 
on so many uses, the court in Weaver concluded that GPS’s prevalence 
in society does not automatically lead to a wide-spread concession of 
personal privacy to law enforcement authorities that may use this tech-
                                                                                                                      
141 See 909 N.E.2d at 1203 (finding that the installation and use of a GPS device to 
monitor an individual requires a warrant supported by probable cause). Similarly, in 2009, 
in Commonwealth v. Connolly, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found that the in-
stallation and use of a GPS device to monitor the defendant’s minivan was a seizure that 
required a warrant under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 14 
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 913 N.E.2d at 370. In a concurrence, three 
justices found that the use of GPS monitoring invaded defendant’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy and therefore should be characterized as a search. Id. at 376 (Gants, J., concur-
ring). 
142 Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1195–96. 
143 Id. at 1196. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 1199. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1199; see Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223; Koppel, supra note 115, at 
1074–75. 
149 See Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1200; see also Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284. 
150 Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1202–03. 
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nology.151 Invoking the Katz test, the court found that popular use of 
GPS-based devices has not led to a drastic decrease in the reasonable 
expectation that certain personal information will remain private.152 
Especially where GPS is not voluntarily used and is instead covertly in-
stalled, a reasonable expectation of privacy still exists.153 Constitutional 
protections help realize this expectation.154 Although there is a dimin-
ished expectation of privacy on public roads, an individual does not 
consent to “unsupervised disclosure to law enforcement authorities of 
all that GPS can and will reveal.”155 Such a massive invasion of privacy 
from prolonged GPS surveillance, the court concluded, is “inconsistent 
with even the slightest reasonable expectation of privacy.”156 
D. The Maynard Approach 
 In 2010, the D.C. Circuit split with the Ninth and Seventh Circuits 
by holding in Maynard that prolonged GPS monitoring constituted a 
search because it defeated petitioner’s reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.157 In Maynard, police, without a warrant, installed a GPS tracking 
device on the Jeep of one of the defendants and used it to monitor his 
movements twenty-four hours a day for four weeks as part of a drug dis-
tribution investigation.158 Then, the government did not merely use the 
information obtained through the GPS to identify the location of de-
fendant’s “stash houses” or to demonstrate his movements on an iso-
lated trip.159 Instead, the government relied cumulatively on the in-
formation obtained through the GPS to present a complete record of 
the defendant’s movements over the course of an entire month.160 The 
jury convicted both defendants for conspiracy to distribute and posses-
                                                                                                                      
151 Id. at 1200. 
152 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1200. 
153 Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1200. 
154 See id. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 1201 (emphasis added). 
157 Compare 615 F.3d at 555–56 (holding that Knotts does not govern because the use of 
GPS defeated appellant’s reasonable expectation of privacty), with Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 
at 1216 (holding that Knotts governs because GPS revealed the same information police 
could have obtained by following the vehicle), and Garcia, 474 F.3d at 997 (holding that 
GPS is merely a substitute for following a car on a public street and therefore no Fourth 
Amendment search occurred). 
158 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 549, 555. 
159 Id. at 562. 
160 Id. 
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sion with intent to distribute, five kilograms or more of cocaine and 
fifty grams of cocaine base.161 The defendants appealed.162 
                                                                                                                     
 The D.C. Circuit reversed the conviction of the defendant whose 
Jeep the police tracked using GPS, concluding that it was based in part 
on evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search.163 Finding 
the use of GPS a Fourth Amendment search, the court distinguished 
Maynard from Knotts.164 It concluded that Knotts was limited to its hold-
ing that a person traveling on a public road has no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in his movements from one place to another, “not that such 
a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements 
whatsoever, world without end . . . .”165 Additionally, the court ad-
dressed the circuit courts that had relied on Knotts in concluding that 
GPS monitoring does not constitute a search.166 According to the May-
nard court, those circuit courts wrongly concluded that the Supreme 
Court in Knotts reserved the question of whether “wholesale” or “mass” 
electronic surveillance of many individuals requires a warrant.167 In-
stead, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that the Supreme Court had actually 
reserved the issue of whether prolonged electronic surveillance re-
quired a warrant.168 
 According to the Maynard Court, the prolonged nature of the GPS 
use was the principal reason that the surveillance in Maynard was a 
search.169 In so holding, the court distinguished GPS technology from 
mere visual surveillance.170 Visual surveillance is limited for practical 
reasons (e.g., time and expense) from lasting very long, whereas GPS 
surveillance is not so limited.171 Based on the extended period of time 
over which the government tracked the petitioner, the totality of the 
information that the police obtained through the GPS was not exposed 
 
161 Id. at 549. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 568. 
164 See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556–58. 
165 Id. at 557 (emphasis added); see Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281. The Court in Knotts specifi-
cally avoided the question of whether prolonged and sustained monitoring over a period 
of time would constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. 460 U.S. at 284; Maynard, 
615 F.3d at 556–57; see Hutchins, supra note 10, at 453. 
166 See Maynard, 615 U.S. at 557–58; Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216; Garcia, 474 F.3d at 
997. 
167 Maynard, 615 U.S. at 558 (emphasis added). 
168 Id. 
169 See id. at 563. 
170 See id. at 565. 
171 See id. 
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to the public.172 Thus, unlike in Pineda-Moreno and Garcia, the informa-
tion acquired in Maynard was fundamentally different from the type of 
evidence that the police could have otherwise obtained by following a 
car.173 Instead, the evidence in Maynard was neither actually nor con-
structively exposed.174 
 First, regarding whether the defendant was actually exposed to the 
public, the court noted that using GPS evidence to prove several 
movements over the course of many weeks was fundamentally different 
from using GPS evidence to prove one movement.175 Unlike an indi-
vidual’s movement on a single trip, “the whole of one’s movements over 
the course of a month is not actually exposed to the public because the 
likelihood anyone will observe all those movements is effectively nil.”176 
Second, the Maynard Court held that the information that the police 
discovered using GPS surveillance was not constructively exposed.177 The 
court reasoned that even though each individual movement may be 
exposed to the public when one travels on public roads, the whole of 
one’s movements is not constructively exposed because “that whole re-
veals more—sometimes a great deal more—than does the sum of its 
parts.”178 Sustained surveillance over a long period of time reveals in-
formation not obtainable through short-term surveillance, and may 
reveal an “intimate picture” of an individual’s life.179 The reasonable 
person does not expect anyone to monitor and retain a record each 
time that person drives a car.180 Instead, the reasonable person expects 
each movement to remain “disconnected and anonymous.”181 Thus, 
prolonged GPS surveillance reveals more information about an indi-
vidual than that individual expects anyone to know.182 
                                                                                                                      
172 Id. at 558. 
173 See Maynard, 615 U.S. at 562–63; Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216; Garcia, 474 F.3d at 
997; see also Otterberg, supra note 36, at 697. 
174 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558. 
175 Id. at 560. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 561 (emphasis added). 
178 Id. at 558. 
179 Id. at 563. The court analogized “mosaic theory,” typically used by the government 
in cases involving national security information, to the intimate picture prolonged GPS 
surveillance paints—what may not be useful in small, disparate pieces can provide signifi-
cant information in total. Id. at 562. 
180 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563. 
181 Id. (quoting Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 772 (1970) (Breitel, J., 
concurring)). 
182 Id.; see Hutchins, supra note 10, at 455–56; Otterberg, supra note 36, at 698. 
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 Having decided that the GPS surveillance in Maynard was a 
“search,” the D.C. Circuit next applied the two-part Katz test to deter-
mine if the search violated the Fourth Amendment.183 The court found 
that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
movements over the course of a month, and that GPS surveillance of 
these movements defeated this reasonable expectation.184 Furthermore, 
the intrusion into one’s life made by prolonged GPS surveillance ex-
ceeds the intrusion of other police practices that the Supreme Court has 
found constitute a search under Katz.185 The Maynard court also noted 
that several States had enacted legislation penalizing warrantless use of 
electronic tracking devices and requiring the exclusion of evidence ob-
tained in such a manner.186 This legislation, the court reasoned, bol-
stered its conclusion that GPS monitoring defeats an expectation of pri-
vacy that American society believes is reasonable.187 The court, however, 
was careful to limit its decision to the facts at hand, recognizing that the 
Supreme Court requires “Fourth Amendment cases [to] be decided on 
the facts of each case, not by extravagant generalizations.”188 
 Thus, according to Maynard, one has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy when the information obtained through surveillance technology 
creates an “intimate picture” of everyday life.189 An “intimate picture” is 
created when surveillance provides prolonged, continuous, detailed in-
formation about an individual that is neither actually nor constructively 
exposed to the public.190 Therefore, when law enforcement’s use of GPS 
technology paints an “intimate” picture of a person’s life, the invasion 
into that individual’s private life violates his reasonable expectation of 
privacy and warrants Fourth Amendment protections.191 
                                                                                                                      
183 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563; see Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
184 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563; see Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
185 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563. The intrusion of GPS exceeds that of a urine test, an elec-
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Court has ruled amount to a search under the Katz test. Id. at 563–64; see Katz, 389 U.S. at 
361; see also Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40; Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 339 (2000). 
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189 Id. at 564; see In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of 
Historical Cell-Site Info. (Cell-Site Info.), 736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 584 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (adopt-
ing the reasoning in Maynard). 
190 See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562–63; Cell-Site Info., 736 F. Supp. 2d at 584. 
191 See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563; Hutchins, supra note 10, at 457; Otterberg, supra note 
36, at 701. 
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III. Maynard’s Effect on Government Requests for  
Historical Cell-Site Data 
 The reaction to the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in Maynard was swift.192 
Although some courts rejected the ruling, preferring to rely on United 
States v. Knotts, others adopted Maynard’s approach as the modern stan-
dard for analyzing whether certain forms of surveillance impinge on an 
individual’s privacy right.193 The Maynard analysis implicates cases in-
volving technologies that allow for prolonged surveillance otherwise 
unavailable to humans.194 Maynard has had an immediate impact, for 
example, in cases in which the Government seeks cellular phone site 
data to determine an individual’s whereabouts.195 Section A introduces 
cell-site technology and explores the standards courts have used to eva-
luate whether police use of cell-site data constitutes a “search.”196 Sec-
tion B then addresses how courts, in light of Maynard, have reconsid-
ered the standard they should use to grant law enforcement requests 
for access to cell-site data.197 
A. Cell-Site Technology 
 Like installing a GPS on a car, law enforcement also uses cell site 
information (“CSI”) emitted from cell phones to monitor an individ-
ual’s movements.198 Whenever a cell phone is turned on, it communi-
cates with nearby cellular towers roughly every seven seconds to ensure 
that incoming calls can be received.199 By analyzing the signal strength’s 
time and angle of arrival at nearby cell towers, the location of the 
                                                                                                                      
192 See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 568 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub 
nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011); see also United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 
617 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (invoking Maynard to note 
that GPS devices record electronic information from which law enforcement can deduce a 
variety of private information about individuals); United States v. Sparks, 750 F. Supp. 2d 
384, 396 (D. Mass. 2010) (rejecting Maynard in finding that the defendant had no reason-
able expectation of privacy in the movement of his vehicle on public streets); In re Applica-
tion of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data (Cell Site Data), 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 840 (S.D. 
Tex. 2010) (adopting Maynard); Cell-Site Info., 736 F. Supp. 2d at 596 (denying the Gov-
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193 See Sparks, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 391; Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 846; Cell-Site Info., 
736 F. Supp. 2d at 596. 
194 See Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 846; Cell-Site Info., 736 F. Supp. 2d at 596. 
195 See Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 846; Cell-Site Info., 736 F. Supp. 2d at 596. 
196 See infra notes 198–211 and accompanying text. 
197 See infra notes 212–224 and accompanying text. 
198 See Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 829; Cell-Site Info., 736 F. Supp. 2d at 579. 
199 Chamberlain, supra note 19, at 1752; McLaughlin, supra note 19, at 426. 
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phone’s signal can be determined.200 These measurements are known 
as Time of Difference of Arrival (“TDOA”) and Angle of Arrival 
(“AOA”) respectively.201 When TDOA and AOA are available from three 
cellular towers, the location information (also called triangulation) is at 
its most accurate.202 For this reason, CSI tracking in cities is more accu-
rate than in rural areas with fewer cellular towers.203 Depending on the 
number of towers in a given area, it is possible to pinpoint a person’s 
location via their cell phone to within a few meters.204 Additionally, over 
ninety percent of cell phones currently have built-in GPS capabilities 
which are used to locate those needing help in emergencies.205 
                                                                                                                     
 Because cell phone service providers store CSI, law enforcement 
agencies who want access to this information must request a court or-
der.206 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”) governs 
CSI.207 Requests for a prospective court order to obtain real-time cell 
phone location information are generally not granted absent a gov-
ernment showing of probable cause.208 Requests for historical CSI, on 
the other hand, have been assessed under the Stored Communications 
Act (“SCA”), part of the ECPA.209 Because the SCA regulates access to 
records that exist and that cell phone providers store, courts had gen-
erally treated requests for historical CSI as less of an invasion of privacy 
than requests for real-time data.210 Thus, courts typically granted access 
to historical CSI on a less exacting basis than probable cause.211 
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B. Post-Maynard: Historical CSI and Probable Cause 
 In the wake of Maynard, magistrate judges have reevaluated the 
standard under which they order disclosure of historical CSI.212 In 2010, 
in Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing Release of Historical Cell-Site 
Information, Magistrate Judge James Orenstein of the U.S. District Court 
for the Eastern District of New York relied heavily on Maynard in deny-
ing the government’s request for warrantless access to fifty-eight days of 
historical cell-site location records.213 The government sought a court 
order directing the provider to disclose all “recorded information iden-
tifying the base station towers and sectors that received transmission” 
with respect to all calls and text messages from an individual’s cell 
phone.214 Although the court noted several factual differences between 
the real-time GPS technology used in Maynard and the historical data 
sought in the instant case, the court sided with Maynard.215 Judge Oren-
stein agreed that United States v. Knotts is not controlling on the issue of 
prolonged location tracking.216 He also agreed with Maynard’s approach 
of protecting one’s privacy when technology allows for prolonged, de-
tailed tracking that would otherwise be impossible.217 
 The court found that the information that the government sought 
to obtain painted no less intimate a picture “simply because it ha[d] al-
ready been painted.”218 Furthermore, a cell phone user has an objec-
tively reasonable expectation of privacy in call location because that in-
formation is a “special class of customer information” and may only be 
used or disclosed in an emergency situation.219 Additionally, any grow-
ing awareness about the possibility of location tracking through cell 
phones has resulted in society’s increased expectation in controlling this 
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monitoring.220 Advances in technology do not come with the expecta-
tion that society has lost its right to privacy.221 In fact, they produce an 
increased awareness of the importance of privacy.222 In concluding that 
government access to historical cell site data requires a showing of 
probable cause, Judge Orenstein noted that society’s reasonable expec-
tations of privacy are continually changing as technology plays an in-
creasingly prevalent role in everyday lives.223 What constitutes an unrea-
sonable invasion into one’s privacy must “evolve along with the myriad 
ways in which humans contrive to interact with one another.”224 
IV. Squaring Precedent with Technology 
 There is inherent tension in the Fourth Amendment’s ability to 
properly protect a reasonable expectation of privacy.225 On the one 
hand, the State has a societal interest in waging the never-ending fight 
against crime.226 On the other hand, as members of a free and democ-
ratic society, Americans place significant importance on protecting in-
dividual rights.227 The Supreme Court has struggled for some time to 
referee this tension when analyzing the constitutional implications of 
law enforcement’s use of technology to conduct surveillance at a level 
exceeding human capabilities.228 The Court, however, has acknowl-
edged the risks that technology places on Fourth Amendment protec-
tions.229 In 1971, Justice Harlan, in his dissent in the Supreme Court 
case of United States v. White, cautioned that technological devices could 
become an “Orwellian Big Brother.”230 Justice William O. Douglas, also 
dissenting in White, similarly warned that: 
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[T]he concepts of privacy which the Founders enshrined in 
the Fourth Amendment vanish completely when we slavishly 
allow an all powerful government, proclaiming law and order, 
efficiency, and other benign purposes, to penetrate all the 
walls and doors which men need to shield them from the 
pressures of a turbulent life around them and give them the 
health and strength to carry on.231 
Three decades later, in 2001, Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the Su-
preme Court majority in United States v. Kyllo, considered the risk of 
technology eroding Fourth Amendment privacy protections.232 As 
technology grows ever-more powerful, the Court’s Fourth Amendment 
precedent regarding technological surveillance becomes outdated.233 
 This Part addresses these Fourth Amendment tensions and the 
need for Fourth Amendment analysis to keep pace with changing tech-
nology.234 Section A argues that current Supreme Court precedent re-
garding surveillance technology and the Fourth Amendment is out-
dated and incapable of protecting individual liberties given the current 
state of technology.235 Section B argues that the D.C. Circuit’s “intimate 
picture” analysis, adopted in United States v. Maynard, would strike a 
more appropriate balance between individual liberties and the ability of 
law enforcement to use surveillance technology for investigations.236 
Finally, Section C argues that courts should apply Maynard’s approach to 
any surveillance technology capable of painting an “intimate picture” 
and considers how courts might go about applying this standard.237 
A. Outdated Technology, Outdated Precedent 
 The two prong reasonable expectation of privacy test dictated Jus-
tice Harlan’s concurrence in United States v. Katz attempts to draw a line 
between law enforcement’s interest in the effective use of technology 
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and the public interest in protecting civil liberties.238 First, the test asks 
whether an individual manifests a subjective expectation of privacy.239 
This prong examines whether the individual “acted in such a way that it 
would be reasonable for him to expect that he would not be ob-
served.”240 The test then examines whether the individual’s expectation 
is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.241 In this way, 
the Katz test acts as a dividing line between forms of government intru-
sion that are permissible on their face, without being subjected to con-
stitutional protections, and those more invasive forms of intrusion that 
warrant Fourth Amendment protections.242 In practice though, the 
Supreme Court has failed to provide consistent interpretations of what 
constitutes a “reasonable” expectation of privacy.243 In effect, what is 
“reasonable” has come to mean whatever a majority of Supreme Court 
justices says it means.244 As a result, the Court’s conception of privacy 
has become, as several commentators have observed, “deleterious to 
liberty, and totally out of touch with society.”245 
 Although the Fourth Amendment can be properly applied in a 
high-tech society, the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment analysis 
thus far has been arbitrary, relying on subjective rules that are applied 
inconsistently.246 In addition, what society considers a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy has evolved with advances in technology and shifts 
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in societal norms.247 The framers could have never predicted the kinds 
of devices that law enforcement now use to conduct surveillance.248 
Because society has changed, and because technology that law en-
forcement uses to conduct surveillance has become publically available, 
society’s expectations about the kind of information that is publically 
available has changed.249 
 The Supreme Court in United States v. Knotts seems to have recog-
nized this very point when it reserved the issue of whether twenty-four 
hour dragnet surveillance might one day violate one’s reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy.250 In so doing, the Court noted its concern for law 
enforcement abuse of surveillance technology and the potential for that 
technology to threaten Fourth Amendment principles.251 When Knotts 
was decided in 1983, twenty-four hour surveillance of citizens was tech-
nologically impossible.252 Furthermore, tracking devices were not widely 
available to the public.253 Although the Court was attuned to the fact 
that government’s use of technology must square with Fourth Amend-
ment protections, the Court failed to further address the issue.254 
 Without addressing prolonged surveillance directly, the Court in 
Knotts ruled that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in movements from one place to another on public thoroughfares.255 
This is because a driver traveling from one place to another publically 
displays any stops and the location of the final destination.256 This rule 
has subsequently been upheld by federal courts, however, as an abso-
lute rule barring a reasonable expectation of privacy while on public 
thoroughfares.257 This is not how the Supreme Court intended Knotts 
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to be interpreted.258 In fact, in 1979, the Supreme Court in Delaware v. 
Prouse emphasized that an individual does not lose a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy when travelling on public roads: 
An individual operating or traveling in an automobile does 
not lose all reasonable expectation of privacy . . . . Automobile 
travel is a basic, persuasive, and often necessary mode of 
transportation to and from one’s home, workplace, and lei-
sure activities. Many people spend more hours each day trav-
eling in cars than walking the streets. . . . Were the individual 
subject to unfettered governmental intrusion every time he 
entered an automobile, the security guaranteed by the 
Fourth Amendment would be seriously circumscribed. . . . 
[P]eople are not shorn of all Fourth Amendment protection 
when they step from their homes onto the sidewalks [or] . . . 
when they step from the sidewalks into their automobiles.259 
Thus, while an automobile may be less private than a home, an individ-
ual does not completely shed an expectation of privacy upon leaving 
the home, entering a vehicle, and embarking on daily life.260 
 The use of current technological surveillance methods requires 
stronger constitutional protections.261 Current surveillance technology 
allows for surveillance over a prolonged period of time and has reached 
a point beyond which the Court’s current precedent in Knotts can prop-
erly address.262 Courts forced to analyze the constitutionality of law en-
forcement’s prolonged use of surveillance technology without a warrant 
should not apply Knotts broadly.263 Such a broad application would sub-
stantially invade personal privacy and was not the intent of the Knotts 
Court.264 Furthermore, for courts to equate short-term, intermittent 
surveillance, like the beeper used in Knotts, with prolonged, advanced 
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monitoring would defy societal norms.265 Advanced surveillance tech-
nology intrudes upon what has historically been considered a “private 
enclave,” and has increased awareness of the importance of privacy.266 
Surveillance technology no longer merely supplants or enhances hu-
man capabilities.267 Instead, technological development has given rise to 
completely new methods of surveillance that far exceeds human capa-
bilities.268 These enhanced forms of surveillance track an individual’s 
daily life for as long as they are used by law enforcement.269 Additionally, 
because devices are monitored remotely, sometimes from offices world-
wide, law enforcement agents no longer need to be nearby receiving a 
signal through a transmitter.270 This allows law enforcement to conduct 
indefinite surveillance.271 The information law enforcement is able to 
obtain as a result provides a full and detailed account of an individual’s 
life.272 In this way, technology has provided the government the means 
to enact the once mythical Orwellian State, and current Supreme Court 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence allows this to go unchecked.273 
 State courts on the other hand have been more attuned to the 
pace at which surveillance technology has and continues to progress.274 
Through “new federalism,” these courts have provided greater protec-
tion to individual liberties than federal courts.275 Where they saw Su-
preme Court precedent lacking, States have turned to their own state 
constitutions.276 Unwilling to analogize current forms of surveillance 
technology with the beeper in Knotts, States have adopted their own, 
more modern standards which more effectively protect a person’s rea-
sonable expectation of privacy.277 In so doing, state court decisions and 
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subsequent state legislation have been responsive to what society is pre-
pared to recognize as a reasonable expectation of privacy.278 
B. The Maynard “Intimate Picture” Approach 
 For the Fourth Amendment to effectively protect against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, there must be a limit to the amount of 
information that the State, without demonstrating probable cause, can 
obtain regarding the long-term whereabouts of an individual while in 
public.279 Maynard’s “intimate picture” approach identifies and ad-
dresses an appropriate limit on warrantless technological surveil-
lance.280 This analysis properly departs from the Supreme Court’s focus 
on whether a specific surveillance technology merely enhances law en-
forcement’s physical capability to conduct a similar form of surveil-
lance.281 Focusing on this issue, the Court has generally concluded that 
where technology merely enhanced law enforcement’s physical capabil-
ity, like the beeper used in Knotts, there is no search under the Fourth 
Amendment.282 This focus, however, does not adequately protect an 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy because almost all tech-
nological surveillance methods “enhance” law enforcement’s ability to 
conduct surveillance in one way or another.283 
 In contrast, the “intimate picture” doctrine, by focusing on actual 
and constructive exposure to the public, can protect one’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy in movements over a prolonged period of 
time.284 One has a reasonable expectation of privacy when the informa-
tion obtained through surveillance technology creates an “intimate pic-
ture” of everyday life.285 An “intimate picture” is created when surveil-
lance provides prolonged, continuous, detailed information about an 
individual that is neither actually nor constructively exposed to the 
public.286 The whole of a person’s movements over a prolonged period 
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is “not actually exposed to the public because the chance that a stran-
ger would observe all of these movements is not just remote, it is essen-
tially nil.”287 Additionally, these movements are not constructively ex-
posed because surveillance of the whole of one’s movements over time 
reveals a different kind of information than would short-term surveil-
lance of any isolated movement.288 Prolonged surveillance creates a 
mosaic of location-based data points that, when pieced together and 
analyzed, provides a detailed window into one’s private life.289 
 Maynard recognized that Fourth Amendment protections must 
square themselves with technology and cannot be thwarted by mere 
technicalities.290 The fact that someone leaves the privacy of the home 
and enters the public arena does not automatically strip that individual 
of a constitutionally protected right to privacy.291 Privacy still exists in 
public.292 The distinction between short-term surveillance and long-
term surveillance is crucial.293 For example, an individual in public 
might reasonably expect someone to monitor movements from point A 
to point B and any stops in between, and thereby lacks a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in that movement.294 That same individual, how-
ever, would have a reasonable expectation of privacy over a prolonged 
period because it is not reasonably expected that someone could moni-
tor movements twenty-four hours a day for weeks or months.295 In fact, 
prolonged use of surveillance technology is inconsistent with even the 
slightest reasonable expectation of privacy.296 Surveillance that provides 
an “intimate picture” of one’s life should constitute a search under the 
Fourth Amendment and thus should require probable cause and a 
search warrant, in keeping with constitutional principles.297 
C. New Precedent for the Twenty-First Century 
 Because it properly addresses privacy concerns over prolonged 
government surveillance, courts should apply a Maynard analysis to 
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other forms of prolonged surveillance technology that enable law en-
forcement to paint an “intimate picture” of an individual’s life.298 For 
example, government requests for prolonged cell-site data should un-
dergo an “intimate picture” analysis in deciding whether such requests 
should be subject to a required probable cause showing.299 As Applica-
tion of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing Release of Historical Cell-Site Informa-
tion shows, the development of law enforcement’s use of cell-site data to 
track individuals has far surpassed Supreme Court precedent.300 Pro-
longed use of cell-site data, both prospective and historical, creates an 
even more intimate picture of an individual’s everyday life than GPS 
automobile surveillance.301 Because cell phones are generally carried 
on or near the person, they enable law enforcement to obtain compre-
hensive locational information about an individual, not merely the 
whereabouts of a vehicle.302 Cell-site data collected over a long period 
of time and showing the precise locational information allows law en-
forcement to paint a detailed picture, which includes not only where an 
individual walks and drives, but also what stores and even doctors are 
visited, as well as other personal information about which people have 
reasonable expectations of privacy.303 
 A cell phone user has a reasonable expectation of privacy in cell-
site location information because the user does not voluntarily convey 
cell-site data to the cellular service provider in any meaningful way.304 
Instead, cell-site data is automatically conveyed to the cellular service 
provider before then being provided to the government.305 When a cell 
phone user carries a phone all day, every day, that user has a reasonable 
expectation that precise location is not being monitored.306 To find 
otherwise would force consumers to pay a higher price for using cell 
phones—the additional cost of sacrificing their locational privacy.307 
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 This is not to say, however, that any use of surveillance technology 
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.308 Law enforce-
ment has a legitimate need to investigate and prevent crime, and sur-
veillance should be used by police to allow them to do so.309 Yet, courts 
have a responsibility to keep “certain items, locations, and/or pieces of 
information beyond the reach of [the] government . . . .”310 To do so, 
courts need to fully examine the facts presented in each case to deter-
mine whether the use of surveillance technology paints an “intimate 
picture.”311 For example, surveillance used intermittently to locate or 
to monitor an individual’s movements does not provide law enforce-
ment with the kind of data necessary to paint an “intimate picture” of 
one’s private affairs.312 Neither does short-term, continuous surveil-
lance.313 But, prolonged use of surveillance that allows law enforce-
ment to piece together enough information about an individual’s pub-
lic movements to paint an “intimate picture” defeats a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.314 Although each individual movement may it-
self have been in public view, taken together, the totality of these 
movements is neither actually nor constructively exposed to the public 
and thus requires constitutional protection.315 Therefore, the continu-
ous and prolonged use of invasive forms of surveillance should only be 
allowed on a sufficient showing of probable cause.316 
                                                                                                                     
 Adopting an “intimate picture” approach to Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence will be a challenge.317 “Intimate picture” jurisprudence 
will have to evolve over time.318 Determining whether or not the gov-
ernment’s use of surveillance technology creates an “intimate picture” 
could result in wide-spread litigation in the early stages of the test’s 
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use.319 Courts will be required to identify, based on the facts of each 
case, whether law enforcement’s use of surveillance was so comprehen-
sive and invasive as to reveal an “intimate picture” of an individual de-
fendant’s life.320 This, however, will not drastically change the way courts 
conduct Fourth Amendment analysis.321 Each case that raises a Fourth 
Amendment issue is decided on its own facts and “not by extravagant 
generalizations.”322 Initially, courts will be challenged to ensure that 
their decisions do not amount to unguided discretionary rulings, but 
sound Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.323 Defendants seeking to 
suppress evidence by raising claims that the use of surveillance against 
them amounted to a Fourth Amendment search will bear the burden of 
showing that the information revealed by the surveillance was constitu-
tionally protected.324 Over time, however, courts will refine the defini-
tion of an “intimate picture” and be able to provide clear guidance re-
garding constitutionally protected information.325 In turn, this will 
provide law enforcement with clear guidelines as to the conditions and 
length of time they can permissibly use surveillance technology to moni-
tor an individual’s whereabouts without a warrant.326 Law enforcement 
officers who seek prolonged surveillance should be required to docu-
ment their reasons for doing so in a warrant application and submit the 
application for judicial review.327 
Conclusion 
 Law enforcement’s ability to conduct investigations and individu-
als’ liberty are often competing interests. When technology provides 
law enforcement the ability to perform surveillance at a level that oth-
erwise would be physically impossible, individual liberties generally suf-
fer. Although law enforcement should not be forced to turn a blind eye 
to emerging technologies, it is important that law enforcement’s inter-
ests do not swallow individual liberty interests. Surveillance technology 
                                                                                                                      
319 See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 n.5 (1986); Maynard, 615 
F.3d at 566; Sparks, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 395. 
320 See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 566; Hutchins, supra note 10, at 455. 
321 See Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 238 n.5; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284–85; Maynard, 615 F.3d 
at 566. 
322 See Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 238 n.5. 
323 See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 566; Kerr, supra note 22, at 883. 
324 See Hutchins, supra note 10, at 455, 457. 
325 See Kerr, supra note 22, at 883. 
326 See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 566; Sparks, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 395; Kerr, supra note 22, at 
883–84. 
327 See Slobogin, supra note 53, at 436. 
2011] Adopting the Fourth Amendment “Intimate Picture” Analysis 1943 
has outpaced corresponding Supreme Court Fourth Amendment 
precedent. As a result, the precedent that exists to deal with surveil-
lance technology’s infringement on personal privacy is inadequate. 
Now that the D.C. Circuit, in Maynard, has split with other circuit courts 
regarding the constitutionality of warrantless GPS surveillance, and 
other courts have followed suit, it is crucial that the Supreme Court es-
tablish clear precedent that properly addresses what society deems a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. Failing to address this growing con-
cern now will permit more frequent and larger scale invasions of pri-
vacy to go unchecked. An individual has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his whereabouts over a prolonged period of time since such 
information is neither actually nor constructively exposed. Therefore, 
the government should be required to obtain a warrant before employ-
ing technology to obtain this information. 
Eli R. Shindelman 
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